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Abstract
New uncertainties in international relations have presented several states in the West with important 
choices regarding their national strategies for the Arctic. This article analyzes security challenges 
in the Arctic and North Atlantic region, as understood by some key North-Atlantic states, namely: 
the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the UK, Germany and France. By analyzing how, or to 
what degree, the colder east-west security landscape since 2014 is reflected in these selected North 
Atlantic states’ Arctic security strategies, this article seeks to improve our understanding of how 
the security situation in the northernmost part of the world is developing and being understood. 
Through applying a traditional understanding of security, the article identifies similarities but also 
significant differences among the Arctic and North-Atlantic states. Most notable when comparing 
the strategies is the rather unique global perspective laid out in the US security strategy for the 
region. The British, Norwegian, Danish and Canadian perspectives, on the other hand, stand out 
as more regional in nature. Germany displays a rather low profile in its approach to international 
security in the Arctic, considering its economic status in Europe. France reveals a strong concern 
for Arctic shipping and freedom of navigation, a perspective similar to the USA’s, but with less 
global ambition.
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Introduction
New uncertainties in international relations have presented states in the West with 
some important choices regarding future security and defence planning in the 
Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. With the corona virus pandemic sweeping across the 
world in 2020, a new understanding of societal vulnerability has emerged. However, 
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tensions and uncertainties present before the pandemic are continuing to structure 
international relations today. Among the North Atlantic states, these uncertainties 
pertain to a more assertive, outward-looking Russia, as well as to the rise of China as 
a global superpower. In addition, western democracies questioning the robustness of 
a decades-old security architecture like NATO’s is also new.1,2 These developments 
should be seen in parallel with the spread of populism, and through the lens of 
decades of downsizing defence spending in substantial parts of Europe, challenging 
credible national self-defence capabilities. 
With an international situation characterized by renewed great power rivalry in 
the Arctic, it is important to follow key international stakeholders’ security thinking 
with a careful eye. This article seeks to analyze the strategic thinking of some key 
North Atlantic states with respect to their Arctic strategies. In order to go deeper into 
the subjects under investigation, this article emphasises traditional3 aspects of secu-
rity and defence. This is a focus that is widely applied within (main-stream) security 
studies, and the International Relations (IR) sub-discipline of “strategic studies” – a 
tradition that tends to be concerned with military capabilities and threats.4 Hence, 
this approach differs from investigations that apply an expanded understanding of 
security, which touch upon the societal and ecological dimensions5 of security.6 
Within the tradition of strategic studies, the security of the state is usually at the core, 
alongside questions pertaining to great-power competition and the preservation of 
the status quo in the international system.7 
Specifically, this article asks: 1) To what degree and to what extent are concerns 
over military threats reflected in the North Atlantic states’ current Arctic 
security strategies?, and 2) Why and to what degree does the Arctic region 
have different strategic value to the North Atlantic states? 
The selected North Atlantic states placed under scrutiny are the USA, Canada, 
Denmark/Greenland and Norway – all Atlantic states bordering the Arctic Ocean. 
In addition – to make the study more comprehensive – the three most prominent 
European powers, and Euro-Atlantic states, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France, will also be investigated to create a more complete picture of the situation 
viewed from the North Atlantic region. 
The paper begins with a brief review of key features of military power in the Arctic/ 
North Atlantic region, including an assessment of how these power capabilities play 
into the security politics of the region today. This review is followed by a mostly 
descriptive section assessing key Arctic security strategies of the North Atlantic 
states. Based on these two components, a discussion of the threats to Arctic security, 
including the region’s strategic role for the different states under scrutiny follows. 
The time focus of this article comprises 2014 and beyond. The year 2014 marks 
the year of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, an important event in post-Cold War 
international relations. Concretely, the annexation, which is generally viewed as ille-
gal in the West, was followed by strict economic and diplomatic sanctions by NATO 
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and EU countries, along with NATO’s enhanced focus on territorial defence.8,9,10 
More specifically, the crisis led to the deployment of NATO troops to a number of 
states bordering Russia (the Baltic states and Poland) through the European Reassur-
ance Initiative (2014), renamed the European Deterrence Initiative two years later.11 
These developments led to a freeze in most political level contact between Moscow 
and EU/NATO countries, and a suspension in practical cooperation between Russia 
and NATO.12 While it can be debated just how deeply the Crimea crisis, in itself, 
divided Russia from the West in the Arctic,13,14 focusing on 2014 and beyond is a rel-
evant time delineation for this article, given the above mentioned western responses 
to the event, and the topic under investigation. 
With respect to the term “strategic”– having ancient roots and being heavily influ-
enced by Clausewitzian thinking – this notion, in common usage within the disci-
pline of strategic studies, essentially refers to the “level” where political and military 
considerations intersect.15 As such, NATO’s official terminology offers a relevant 
definition, defining the “strategic level” as “the level at which a nation or group 
of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys 
national, including military, resources to achieve them”.16 
As this article focuses on North Atlantic Artic security strategies, it does not pro-
vide an in-depth investigation of Russian strategies from a Russian perspective. While 
such an additional focus of investigation undoubtedly would have added depth and 
diversity to the analysis, the formal constraints of the article format have not allowed 
for this inclusion. Nevertheless, some of the most important Russian policy papers, 
with respect to Arctic security, will be briefly presented. 
Setting the stage: International relations and security in the Arctic
For a long period, the Arctic has been a region of high geopolitical interest, while 
simultaneously representing a part of the world where peaceful interstate coopera-
tion has existed.17 In this context the work of the Arctic Council, the role and bound-
aries of the Law of the Sea, issues pertaining to Arctic shipping, indigenous issues, 
Arctic resource management, and sustainable development, have been thoroughly 
examined in many studies.18 These studies have often applied a broad understand-
ing of security,19 where issues stretching from societal and economic prosperity and 
stability, to climate change’s effect on individuals, regional communities or indige-
nous people’s livelihoods, have been scrutinized.20,21 With the Russian flag planted 
on the sea floor of the North Pole in 2007,22 fueled by high energy prices and global 
warming, a wave of debate on Arctic geopolitics followed.23 While the media debate 
that followed the flag planting was largely centered on traditional aspects of secu-
rity, the epistemological point of departure of many of the academic studies fits well 
within the tradition of critical geopolitics, by not having traditional aspects of state 
security and strategic interest at their core.24,25 However, with the increased tensions 
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the debate in the last few years has 
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also led to greater interest in the genuine security and defence dimension26,27 of the 
Arctic, as found within the tradition of strategic studies.28,29 Many of these studies 
illustrate and discuss the tenser security dynamic in the High North,30 a situation 
that has also been characterized as the “new normal” in the East-West relationship.31 
Military power in the Arctic of today
From the point of view of NATO and the North Atlantic states, the recent decade-
long Russian re-armament32 program has not gone unnoticed.33 In the same way, the 
revival of the Russian bastion34 defence concept, centered around the key mission 
to protect Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), has re-emerged as 
a key scenario for defence planning in the Arctic for the North Atlantic states.35,36 
In unclassified western assessments of the Russian bastion defence planning con-
cept, Russian armed forces are assumed to have an ambition to control the Barents 
Sea and its surrounding areas.37,38 In addition, Russia is assumed to seek to ensure 
sea and air denial in large parts of the Arctic Ocean as well as the Northernmost part 
of the Norwegian Sea, all the way south to the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, UK) 
gap.39,40 
As the Russian Northern Fleet gradually has been outfitted with highly capable 
and multi-layered air and coastal defence and denial capabilities, involving a “state 
of the art” S-400 air defence system, P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles, and 
Kalibr land attack cruise missiles, Russian systems for denial and control in large 
parts of the Arctic Ocean, the Barents sea and the Norwegian Sea, are credible.41
For these North Atlantic states, the central threat represented by the bastion 
defence, is linked to the assumption that Russia is likely to take far-reaching military 
measures in the Barents Sea and North Atlantic if threatened, measures taken in 
order to protect their SSBNs, which have the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean as their 
primary operational theatre.42,43 As the SSBNs are generally assumed to represent 
the most credible deterrence through their second strike capability (given the diffi-
culties to detect and neutralize such submarines for an opponent in a potential first 
strike), these military platforms are of the highest strategic value for Russia.44 
In Russia, key documents from 2014 and beyond, with security implications for 
the Arctic are primarily; the 2014 “Military Doctrine”, the 2015 “Russian National 
Security Strategy”, the 2016 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” 
and the 2020 “Basic Principles of Russian and the Federation State Policy in the 
Arctic to 2035”.45,46 While the three former strategies have no direct link to the Arc-
tic, they underscore a world that, seen from Russia, is characterized by global great 
power competition, pointing out NATO and the USA as the major external threats 
to Russian security. With respect to the latter Arctic-specific strategy, it is particu-
larly important to note how this key document addresses concerns with respect to 
the steady increase in foreign military presence in the Arctic, particularly by NATO 
countries, as a challenge to its national security.47 This development is also reflected 
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in the current Russian nuclear deterrence policy “Basic Principles of State Policy of 
the Russian Federation Nuclear Deterrence” (2020), which focuses on the threats 
posed by “individual states” and “military alliances” which would certainly include 
the USA and NATO.48 
Fig. 1: “The Russian Bastion” where the darker color indicates the area where Russia is assumed 
to control the sea, air and land space in case of a major conflict, while the lighter color indicates 
the area where Russia is assumed to seek to deny hostile activity. (Expert Commission 2015: 21).
The revival of the bastion defence concept and the expansion of cold war military 
bases in the Arctic has raised worries from Washington DC to Oslo. According to the 
Danish intelligence service, Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic “is particularly 
focused on the Nagurskoye fighter aircraft base in the Franz Josef’s Land archipel-
ago, located some 1,000 km from the North Pole”.49 This is a base that is likely to 
be operational in 2020, “making it the world’s northernmost combat aircraft base 
[…] becom[ing] a cornerstone of a forward line of defence in the Arctic Ocean”.50 
The report further underscores that while “Russia’s military build-up in the Arc-
tic […] has a defensive focus, it increasingly contains elements that could also be 
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utilized for offensive operations”.51 With respect to the above-mentioned air base at 
Franz Josef’s land, this base will represent a key land component in both the control 
and denial dimension if the bastion defence is activated. “[T]he base will be able 
to accommodate even the largest transport, bomber and antisubmarine aircraft”.52 
Following this, “Russian combat aircraft deployed at the base could quickly reach the 
north-easternmost parts of Greenland and, using long- range missiles or air-to-air 
refueling, they would have the ability to attack the United States’ Thule Air Base”.53 
This strategic role is also pointed out by the Canadian IR scholar Rob Huebert’s 
statement that, “The location of Nagurskoye Base allows for much closer access to 
North America by Russian bombers. This, combined with the longer ranges of the 
new generation of hypersonic cruise missiles and the nuclear-powered submarine 
drones, increases the risk to North American targets”.54,55 In a similar way, the many 
years of construction work and upgrading at the Northern Fleet’s headquarters and 
surrounding bases in Severomorsk has been associated with the revival of the bastion 
defence concept.56 According to Janes Intelligence Review, these bases have partly 
been upgraded to facilitate new submarines, ships and entire new weapon systems: 
“The upgrade has coincided with the Russian military’s increased activities in the 
Arctic. These upgrades ensure that the Northern Fleet is able to provide the new 
service for Arctic expansion”.57
Additionally, the Norwegian intelligence service points out in its public 2020 
“Focus report”, that the upgrade of the bastion defence and the more precise and 
advanced weapon systems being deployed on its border, give reason for concern. 
The same report highlights “broader complexity” and the “new scalability” of 
the Russian armed forces, as a key development. Such complex operations have 
been demonstrated by recent large-scale exercises: “Whereas the development and 
addition of new capabilities shows how Russian defences are being strengthened, 
Russia’s military activity near Norwegian borders since the summer of 2019 has 
been one continuous demonstration of the defence concept’s emphasis on integra-
tion and scalability”.58 The same report also states how the bastion defence concept 
has been put into practice: “In August the Northern Fleet, together with the Baltic 
Sea Fleet, staged the largest naval exercise seen near Norwegian borders since the 
Cold War. Parts of the Bastion Defence were established all the way down to the 
North Sea.”59,60
Seen from the West, the new Russian military capabilities and bases under con-
struction give reason for concern, especially since they coincide with a signif-
icant increase in the level of training and military exercises taking place in the 
Arctic and North Atlantic region.61 In addition, there is growing unease about 
the potential new role and challenge posed by China as a gradually more active 
Arctic power, even though the scope of China’s current military activities in the 
Arctic is much smaller.62 Nevertheless, China and Russia have recently extended 
their military talks at the commander level to discuss potential cooperation in the 
High North.63 
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The increase in Russian military activity in the Arctic is also reflected on the west-
ern side: a situation that has made observers warn of an arms race in the High 
North.64 Illustrative of an increasing western interest in its warfighting capacities in 
the Arctic is NATO’s new focus on winter training in Norway. While these exercises 
began as far back as 2008 with Cold Response, the latest Trident Juncture exercise 
in the autumn of 2018 is illustrative of an increase in numbers and complexity, with 
the involvement of about 50,000 personnel and a US aircraft carrier strike group, 
representing NATO’s largest exercise in Norway since the Cold War.65,66 Other novel 
developments since the Crimea crisis of 2014 is the rotating presence of US marines 
in northern and central Norway,67 the re-establishing of the US 2nd fleet in the Atlan-
tic (2018),68 and the establishment (2019) of the Joint Force Command (Norfolk) 
tasked with keeping the sea lines of communication between America and Europe 
open.69 
Last year’s annual anti-submarine warfare exercises, Dynamic Mongoose, focus-
ing on high intensity, symmetric warfighting and under ice operations in the Arctic 
Ocean is also an indication of the North Atlantic states’ increased interest in security 
and defence dimensions in the Arctic.70 Finally, besides the large scale multinational 
military exercises, one can also observe a changing pattern in more regular Western 
naval operations. Most prominently, the US Navy has now started to conduct “free-
dom of navigation” operations in the Arctic, as witnessed in the Barents Sea in May 
2020,71 which also included a multinational (USA, UK, Denmark, Norway) exercise 
within the Russian EEZ72 in September 2020.73 This is a type of US naval activity not 
seen in these Arctic waters since the height of the Cold War.74,75 
The trend for more naval activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic region also 
has its equivalent in increased military aviation in the High North. Illustrative of this 
are more frequent flights by strategic bombers including B-2s76 and B-52s,77 as wit-
nessed in Iceland, above the Arctic Circle off the coast of Norway, and in the Barents 
Sea in the fall of 2019 and late summer of 2020.78,79
Security strategies in the Arctic viewed from the North Atlantic states 
The Canadian Professor Rob Huebert has stated “The Russians are very deter-
mined to build up their military in the Arctic. They mean what they say and are 
willing to act”, referring to how the location of the aforementioned Nagurskoye base 
represents new risks for North American targets.80 Huebert is not alone in his con-
cerns. In a 2018 study, Professor Rolf Tamnes calls for a ‘competitive strategy’ for the 
High North: “The High North is central to a Europe ‘free, whole and at peace’ … 
[therefore] NATO should formulate a competitive strategy, taking advantage of its 
own strengths and of Russia’s weaknesses”.81 Washington DC-based Arctic security 
researcher, Heather A. Conley, is also critical of the lack of US engagement in the 
Arctic: “As the United States has stood by, rivals such as Russia and China have 
seized that opportunity both economically and militarily, and their intentions are 
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not wholly benign”.82 Others, like Lieutenant Colonel and Professor Tormod Heier, 
warn of the increased risk of war with the spreading of a zero-sum security logic in 
the Arctic and northern Europe, observing how the Nordic countries have been pre-
occupied with “rapidly raising the costs of aggression, scaring Russia from assertive 
action”, instead of “pursuing self-restraints as a means of building confidence”.83 A 
similar argument has also been voiced by other Arctic experts, like Jeremy McKenzie, 
a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard and researcher for the Center 
for Arctic Study and Policy, who states: “The United States and other Arctic states 
should continue to enhance their cooperative relationship with Russia in the Arctic 
while at the same time using the full range of policy to continue to condemn Russia’s 
illegal actions in other parts of the world”.84 However, other academic voices, like 
Professor Lassi Heininen, argue that the Arctic has experienced increased global 
conflict and tension to a lesser extent than other regions, essentially suggesting that 
little has changed with respect to the security situation in the Arctic.85 
As the military features of great power rivalry are becoming more visible in the 
Arctic, as elsewhere, a recent report to Congress warns that this could challenge the 
traditional American leadership role in this region.86 The following outline takes a 
closer look at the North Atlantic states’ security strategies in the Arctic; these should 
be carefully assessed when analyzing the official security thinking of these selected 
states. 
The USA
The USA is an Arctic state and the world’s only superpower. As the lead nation in 
NATO, carrying the backbone of the alliance’s military capabilities – in addition 
to being the world’s most important democracy – the USA plays a unique role in 
any security calculation by the North Atlantic states. The “Department of Defence 
(DoD) Arctic Strategy” was launched in June 2019.87 This strategy gives the most 
comprehensive expression of the US government’s views on the security situation in 
the Arctic. In addition, one should note that the US Coast Guard’s “Arctic Strategic 
Outlook” from 201988 has a complementary function, specifically addressing the role 
of the coast guard in the north. Similarly, the US Air Force has also introduced its 
own Arctic Strategy, launched in July 2020.89 
Anchored in the 2018 National Defence Strategy (NDS),90 the 2019 DoD Arctic 
Strategy identifies strategic competition from China and Russia – not only in the 
Arctic, but more generally – as the principal challenge to US security interests and 
future prosperity.91 “The Joint Force must be able to deter, and if necessary, defeat 
great power aggression. DoD must prioritize efforts to address the central problem 
the NDS identifies – i.e. the Joint Force’s eroding competitive edge against China 
and Russia.”92 
The resurgence of nation state competition is also highlighted in the Coast Guard’s 
Arctic strategy: “Since the release of the Coast Guard Arctic Strategy in 2013, the 
Njord  Wegge
368
resurgence of nation-state competition has coincided with dramatic changes in the 
physical environment of the Arctic, which has elevated the region’s prominence as 
a strategically competitive space. America’s two nearest-peer powers, Russia and 
China, have both declared the region a national priority”.93 A somewhat similar 
perspective is also indicated by the Air Force’s strategy stating: “Residing at the 
intersection between the U.S. homeland and two critical theaters, Indo-Pacific and 
Europe, the Arctic is an increasingly vital region for U.S. national security interests. 
The Arctic’s capacity as a strategic buffer is eroding, making it an avenue of threat to 
the homeland, due to advancements by great power competitors.”94
The DoD views the Arctic security environment as complex. While acknowledg-
ing that certain “positive, cooperative trends endure in the region”, in particular, the 
US’s strong defence relationships with the six other Arctic states, the strategy states 
that “the region is increasingly uncertain”, and an area where “problematic strategic 
trends” are deepening and becoming more intense.95 The identified uncertainties 
are, on the one side, dependent on climatic factors, such as the consequences of 
decline in sea ice, while on the other hand, these uncertainties also pertain to polit-
ical and military issues. 
The DoD strategy recognizes that Arctic nations historically have “sought to 
isolate the region from wider geopolitical conflict”; however, the reported Russian 
threat “to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations” (in the 
Northern Sea Route), represents a new type of uncertainty.96 The DoD strategy also 
points out how the security environment is changing as the strategic competitor, 
Russia, establishes or re-establishes military bases and facilities on its Arctic islands 
and coastal areas.97 
Finally, the DoD strategy also notes significant concerns about China, poten-
tially posing a risk through “attempts to alter Arctic governance through economic 
leverage”.98 
Given a security climate characterized by great power rivalry and competition, the 
DoD points out the following objectives for the US security strategy in the Arctic: 
1) “To defend the homeland”; 2) to “compete when necessary to maintain favorable 
regional balances of power”, acknowledging “the Arctic as a potential avenue for 
expanding great power competition and aggression”; and 3) to “ensure common 
domains remain free and open”.99 
To reach these strategic objectives the DoD points to a strategic approach for 
the Arctic that emphasises cooperation with allies and partners in the region, while 
underscoring that the US must ensure credible deterrence “to deter strategic com-
petitors from aggression in the Arctic”.100 “The US Arctic deterrent will require 
agile, capable and expeditionary forces with the ability to flexibly project power into 
and operate within the region”.101 In this respect, the Air Force strategy specifi-
cally states: “once the planned F-35 bed-down at Eielson AFB is complete, Alaska’s 
unparalleled concentration of fifth generation fighters will present a highly-effective 
power projection capability”.102
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Both the DoD and the Air Force strategy also emphasize that the US will work 
with its Arctic allies and partners to ensure power projection,103 deter aggression, 
and prevent strategic competitors using the “Arctic as a corridor for expanded com-
petition enabling their objectives in other regions”.104 The partners and allies are 
indeed valued as essential to the US strategic interests: “The network of U.S. allies 
and partners with shared national interests in this rules-based order is the United 
States’ greatest strategic advantage in the Arctic region, and thus the cornerstone of 
DoD’s Arctic strategy”.105 “Maintaining freedoms of navigation and overflight are 
critical to ensuring that the Arctic remains a free and open domain […] DoD will 
continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows […] When neces-
sary and appropriate, the United States will challenge excessive maritime claims in 
the Arctic to preserve the rule based international order.”106 
Canada
Canada is an Arctic state, a key NATO ally, but not a superpower with global security 
ambitions. Canada’s Arctic security strategy is primarily pointed out in the “Safety, 
security, and defence” chapter in the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework.107 In 
addition, the Canadian armed forces general policy “Strong, Secure, Engaged” also 
offers insight into Arctic security thinking as viewed from Ottawa.108 
In the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, the Canadian Government focuses 
on the goal of keeping “The Canadian Arctic and North and its people […] safe, 
secure, and well-defended”.109 It further emphasizes the goal of enhancing Canada’s 
military presence in the northern part of the homeland, including improving its 
awareness, surveillance, and control capabilities.110 
Participation in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), 
including the North Warning System (NWS), is a vital part of Canada’s Arctic secu-
rity engagement and represents a key pillar in US-Canadian Arctic security cooper-
ation.111 In this respect the key, armed forces strategy document, “Strong, Secure, 
Engaged” states that, “While the current NWS is approaching the end of its life 
expectancy from a technological and functional perspective, unfortunately the range 
of potential threats to the continent, such as that posed by adversarial cruise mis-
siles and ballistic missiles, have become more complex and increasingly difficult to 
detect”.112 Canada’s ongoing work with the United States “to ensure that NORAD 
is modernized to meet existing and future challenges” is a key point in order to meet 
this new unpredictability in a more complex arctic security environment.113
The Canadian Armed forces recognize that “a degree of major power compe-
tition has returned to the international system” and that “the Arctic region rep-
resents an important international crossroads where issues of climate change, 
international trade, and global security meet”.114 The armed forces further under-
score that “re-emergence of deterrence” has occurred, and that “changes in the 
international environment demand a new understanding of how and when to 
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lawfully use or threaten to use military force”.115 However, Canada’s security focus 
is essentially regional and internally oriented, focusing on the need to protect the 
North American continent and the sovereignty of the Canadian homeland and its 
local residents.
Denmark/Greenland
Denmark is an Arctic state through its unique political and historic relationship 
with Greenland. With Greenland’s geopolitical importance on the rise, Denmark’s 
security thinking has implications way beyond the Arctic island itself. The current 
Danish security strategy for the Arctic is found in the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s 
“Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020”.116 In addition, the pre-Crimea 
crisis “Kingdom of Denmark, Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020”,117 as well as the 
broad parliamentarian “Defence Agreement 2018-2023”,118 provide important 
insight into the direction of Danish security thinking in the Arctic. 
When assessing the MFA strategy, one can read that “the international order that 
has shaped the world in recent decades can no longer be taken for granted”.119 With 
respect to the Arctic, the government acknowledges “the significant and growing 
geopolitical interests in the region” and its desire to follow closely “the continued 
Russian military build-up […] and expansion of forward bases on the Russian Arctic 
Islands”.120 On the one hand, the strategy states that Copenhagen seeks to make the 
Arctic a “low-tension area”, but on the other hand, it also stresses how NATO has 
intensified its focus on the Arctic.121 
While the pre-Crimea crisis Arctic strategy focuses on the promise of increased 
cooperation with Russia, even within defence, the multi-party defence agreement 
of 2018 has abolished this goal and is now painting a gloomier picture, stating that 
NATO now “faces a challenging and more assertive Russia”.122 
Norway
Norway is an Arctic state located in the northwest corner of Europe. The current 
key documents illuminating Norwegian security thinking in the Arctic are “Norway’s 
Arctic Strategy – between geopolitics and social development” (Government of 
Norway 2017)123, as well as the MFA White Paper: “Setting the course for Norwe-
gian foreign and security policy”.124 Viewed from Oslo, the Arctic has been a stable 
part of the world characterized by low tension for several years. However, the Arctic 
strategy points out new reasons for concern: “Over the last ten years, Russian mili-
tary activity in the north has increased. This increase in activity is not considered to 
be targeted at Norway, but it is nevertheless an important factor in Norway’s security 
and defence policy”.125 The Norwegian MFA further states that: “Russia’s annex-
ation of Crimea in 2014 has changed the security situation. As a result, NATO has 
shifted its attention from out-of-area crisis management to collective defence and 
deterrence within the NATO area”.126 
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With respect to the modernization of Russia’s strategic forces in the north, and its 
relationship to the North-Atlantic and Arctic region, the MFA points out the follow-
ing. “Norway wants to have good neighbourly relations with Russia, and the Gov-
ernment gives high priority to dialogue with the Russian authorities”.127 Questions 
of military security have nevertheless risen on the agenda, and new concerns have 
become more prominent: “In the event of a security crisis, Russia could increase the 
readiness of these forces. This would reduce Norway’s freedom of action and move-
ment on its own territory and limit Allied access to the North Sea and the North 
Atlantic. A situation of this kind would make it more difficult for NATO to provide 
supplies and reinforcements for the defence of Norway and other Allies”.128 With 
Russia’s great power ambitions becoming clearer in the last decade, the Norwegian 
MFA points out in particular how “Russia’s interventions in Georgia in 2008 and 
Ukraine in 2014 [have shown that] Russia is willing and able to use all the instru-
ments of state power, including military force, to safeguard its interests. The use of 
military force in violation of international law creates uncertainty”.129 The new Arc-
tic security environment has also led to an increase in allied training and exercises 
in the Northern parts of Norway over the last few years, both by NATO as well as 
bilateral partners such as the USA and UK.130 
United Kingdom
As an island nation in the North Atlantic, the Arctic region has always been of sig-
nificant interest to the UK. “Beyond the Ice, UK policy towards the Arctic” is the 
current overall UK strategy for the Arctic.131 While this strategy touches on secu-
rity issues, and for example states its concern for “the build-up of Arctic military 
capabilities by several Arctic states”, the strategy does not present British views on 
the security dimension of the Arctic in any detail.132 The most comprehensive offi-
cial document specifying the UK’s strategic interests in the Arctic is the House of 
Commons, Defence Committee’s report: “On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic” 
(2018).133 This report conducts a thorough and investigative approach to the secu-
rity situation in the North Atlantic and Arctic region, followed up by recommenda-
tions for action. 
While the Arctic, as seen from London, has been an area of low tension and 
multi-lateral cooperation in recent years, the House of Commons has now “identified 
the Arctic and the High North as an area of concern, largely due to the increasingly 
clear evidence of Russian military expansion”.134 While the report also mentions 
uncertainties pertaining to the new Chinese interests in the Arctic, Russia remains 
the greatest reason for concern.135 The report further warns that “there is a risk that 
the perception of the Arctic as an area of exceptionalism where unique consider-
ations of governance apply […] could be exploited by nations which have shown an 
increasing disregard for the rule-based international order elsewhere”.136 The report 
states that “the strategic importance of the High North and the North Atlantic to the 
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security of the UK and Europe cannot be overstated”, and recent developments in 
the Arctic are assessed to be of grave importance to the United Kingdom.137 
The most fundamental concern for the UK’s security interest in the Arctic and 
the High North is the fear of Russia using the Arctic military theatre to threaten 
or even block communication lines between America and Europe over the North 
Atlantic. 
Threats from the “bastion defence concept” including sea control/sea denial, 
from the Arctic Ocean to the northern shores of Great Britain, – the Greenland- 
Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap – have again become a challenge to maritime surveillance 
of the North Atlantic states: “The level of Russian naval activity has grown signifi-
cantly […] there has been a tenfold increase in Russian submarine activity in the 
North Atlantic. Russian submarine activity up to the GIUK Gap has been reported 
as being “currently equaling or surpassing Cold War levels”.”138 “The newest class 
of multi-role nuclear powered submarines, the Yasen class, combines the capabili-
ties of an attack submarine with powerful guided missile systems. Crucially, these 
new platforms use the latest quieting technology to make them as undetectable as 
possible.”139 
Hence the House of Common report states: “Although we are not facing chal-
lenges on the same scale today, the prospect of Russian power being projected from 
the High North into the North Atlantic has returned and a comprehensive strategy 
is needed to meet the threat”.140 
Keeping the Russian action in Crimea 2014 in mind, the House of Commons 
states that the Arctic now has: “the renewed presence of a revisionist state in the 
region”.141 The British strategic security and defence priorities should therefore fol-
low two lines: (1) to improve national capacities to counter the perceived growing 
military threats in the Arctic and North Atlantic, given the capability to both control 
large areas and deny western activity according to the bastion defence concept, and 
(2) to work to increase NATO’s commitment to and training in the North-Atlantic 
and Arctic region.142 From this perspective, it points out the importance of improv-
ing military cooperation with Norway and the USA.143 It also emphasises the need 
for an increased number of soldiers to be deployed for annual winter training in 
Northern Norway.144 
France 
As a leading power in Europe, France’s assessment of the security climate in the 
Arctic is important. At the time of writing, France has two Arctic strategy papers of 
high relevance. First, the MFA’s “National roadmap for the Arctic”, labelled “The 
Great Challenge of the Arctic”,145 and second, a strategy paper from the MoD called 
“France and the New Strategic Challenges in the Arctic”.146 While both papers stem 
from the post Crimea-crisis period in Europe, they have strikingly different outlooks 
on the security climate and potential for conflict in the Arctic. While the MFA paper 
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rightly recognizes that the Arctic “offers room for manoeuvre […] and has once 
again become a theatre for contradictory ambitions, especially as Russia’s strategic 
stance changes”, the paper essentially paints a picture of the Arctic as a region of 
cooperation rather than competing strategic interests.147 Stating that “the Arctic has 
progressively become a region of cooperation between the eight [Arctic] countries 
directly concerned”, the French MFA emphasizes positive trends over negative ten-
dencies.148 However, as a state with shipping interests the roadmap also reminds 
readers that France’s “armed forces must remain able to use the Arctic Ocean for 
transit of its naval and air forces, and potentially, for naval air force operations”.149 
Playing down hard security issues, the MFA paper ultimately states that France’s 
main interest in the region “primarily concerns its economy, security and environ-
ment, rather than military and defence issues”.150 
Contrary to the MFA’s Arctic roadmap, the French MoD strategy paper paints 
a much more disturbing picture of developments in the High North. By warning 
that the Arctic one day might “become an area of confrontation”, infamously label-
ling the Arctic “a second Middle East”, the paper displays grave concerns about its 
future.151 Characterizing the Arctic as a “region of growing strategic interest” where 
“the prospect for resource exploitation and the opening of new sea routes give the 
Arctic a new strategic importance”, the essence of the paper does not cohere with 
the message from the French MFA.152 This incoherence is particularly visible with 
respect to how legal regimes relevant to the Arctic are viewed. The MoD statement 
“The Arctic belongs to no one”,153 casts doubts on the role of legal regimes in the 
region, hence, contradicting the message emphasized by the MFA.154 While it is rea-
sonable to assume that the French MFA has the upper hand regarding the official 
French position with respect to interpretation of international law, it is nevertheless a 
stunning statement, and could potentially put France at odds with key NATO allies 
as well as “the Arctic 5” (The Arctic Ocean Coastal states: USA, Canada, Denmark/
Greenland, Norway and Russia). 
Germany 
Germany has the most important economy in Europe and is therefore a key polit-
ical power on the continent. Germany’s position on international political issues is 
on this basis often of interest to international relations. In August 2019, the federal 
government published “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines”.155 This key document 
reveals Germany’s policy priorities and security assessments concerning the Arctic, 
as seen from Berlin. The policy guidelines do not put the main emphasis on the 
hard security challenges of the Arctic, but rather on challenges arising from climate 
change, the need for sustainable development, environmental protection and sci-
entific research. However, Germany also expresses concern over how states, to an 
increasing extent, are using military means to safeguard their interests in the Arctic, 
leading to a type of behavior “which could lead to an arms race”.156 In addition, the 
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policy paper points out that “Arctic dual use capabilities and their continued mod-
ernization as well as technological progress and strategies for external interference 
are blurring the boundaries between offensive and defensive courses of action”.157 
While not specific, Berlin sees “the potential for non-cooperative behavior in the 
Arctic, which endangers economic, environmental and security policy stability in 
the region and thus also affects Germany’s security interests”.158 Even though the 
Arctic Policy guidelines do not mention Russia specifically as a potential challenge 
to Arctic security, it does reiterate the country’s NATO obligations. “The federal 
Government is clearly committed to its Alliance obligation, which stems from its EU 
and NATO membership, and advocates more intensive involvement in the security 
policy implications of the Arctic on the part of the EU and NATO”.159 On this basis, 
one can assume the Germany does not see itself playing a major role as an individual 
security actor in the Arctic, but rather leaving this responsibility to its key political 
and security alliances. 
Arctic Security viewed from the North Atlantic states 
When assessing to what degree and to what extent concerns over military threats in 
the Arctic are reflected in North Atlantic states’ Arctic security strategies, a nuanced 
picture emerges, though with certain similarities. At first glance, it is striking to see 
how the various states agree on many assessments. Almost without exception, the 
Russian revival of Cold War military bases and the strengthening of the bastion 
defence concept with new, highly advanced and very powerful capabilities, tends to 
worry the western capitals. 
While one could argue that the bastion defence concept is essentially defensive in 
nature, aimed at protecting Russia’s second-strike capabilities – the most import-
ant being their strategic SSBN’s – several critical components of this modernized 
defence concept could (not surprisingly) also play, or facilitate, an offensive role. 
From this perspective the improved locations for fighter jets and bomber planes on 
Arctic islands, in combination with highly capable air denial missile systems and 
silent attack and multi-role submarines, have alerted the key maritime powers of the 
North Atlantic, namely the UK and the USA, more so than for example France or a 
continental power like Germany.
In addition to the two above-mentioned key maritime powers – the UK and the 
USA – the Arctic security strategies of states in near proximity to, or even partly 
behind, the geographic reach of the bastion defence, primarily Greenland/Denmark 
and Norway, also quite directly point to the complex military threat from Russia as 
a potential challenge to their security. In a quite similar way, one can also identify 
how Canada, while not being within or directly next to the perimeter of the bastion 
defence, expresses concerns over new long-range, and sophisticated missile systems. 
As the current NWS system appears outdated in the face of new threats to the North 
American continent, the Russian weapon modernization programs have led to a new 
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focus on the need for early warning through NORAD cooperation between Canada 
and the USA.
Following this, the degree to which the revival and strengthening of the Russian 
bastion defence concept is perceived as a challenge would seem to depend on the 
military posture and ambitions of the different states in question, as well as mere 
proximity and geographic location. Among the North-Atlantic states, the US stands 
out in the way its strategic security concerns essentially reflect its superpower role 
and ambitions. In pointing out a threat to strategic mobility in the Arctic, and the fear 
of losing a competitive edge (that is to have a military and technological upper hand 
in case of a symmetric conflict) in a situation characterized by great power competi-
tion, US security concerns for the High North are in essence global in nature. This is 
particularly visible in the way freedom of navigation and overflight operations in the 
Arctic have gained importance in US security and defence planning for the region. 
From this perspective the new, advanced Russian weapon systems, combined with 
the Kremlin’s more assertive military behavior in Europe, are viewed as evidence 
of problems of great power competition rather than developments inherent to the 
Arctic or North Atlantic as such. As Russian capacities evolve, challenge and even 
rival the American armed forces’ capacity to dominate the region,160,161 such devel-
opments threaten the Arctic and North Atlantic’s function as a space, or corridor, for 
the projection of military power to different parts of the world for the superpower. 
Besides the USA, it is particularly views from the UK, Norway, Canada and 
Denmark that articulate concerns about the negative strategic implications of the 
Russian military build-up in the Arctic. For the UK, the statement from the Defence 
Committee in the House of Commons goes furthest noting that “the strategic 
importance of the High North and the North Atlantic to the security of the UK 
and Europe cannot be overstated”.162 As an island state in the North Atlantic, the 
potential of Russia using the Arctic military theatre to threaten or even block com-
munication lines between the USA and Europe, represents a major strategic security 
challenge to the United Kingdom. This is a threat that in latter years has changed 
the UK security strategy towards the Arctic, resulting in a much more engaged and 
robust approach to the region involving its own armed forces. 
The same perspective and approach is in many ways also evident in Norway, 
where, in the event of a crisis, the Russian bastion defence forces, “would reduce 
Norway’s freedom of action and movement on its own territory and limit Allied 
access to the North Sea and the North Atlantic”.163 This is a situation that could 
make it difficult for NATO, and key allies like the USA and UK, to supply Norway 
in case of a security crisis or war.164 The grim assessment of such a situation has led 
to a strategy of enhanced military cooperation with NATO as well as Norway’s key 
bilateral partners, the USA and the UK. 
For Denmark the new Russian air power capacities under development in Franz 
Josef’s land, which have the potential to reach the northern shores of Green-
land in the event of a military conflict,165 is the development causing the most 
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worries in Copenhagen.166 While having a sheltered mainland on continental Europe, 
Denmark’s strategic role as the protector of Greenland makes the country’s position 
somewhat similar to Norway and the UK in the way that it is more directly affected 
by the new Russian capabilities as open lines of communication between Denmark 
and Greenland can be threatened.
While the two French strategy papers for the Arctic send a mixed message, a 
crucial aspect of its approach to the High North is that of ensuring access to the 
region, including the potential utilisation of the Arctic sea routes. In this respect, 
the French strategies share crucial features with the American ones, emphasizing 
strategic mobility and freedom of navigation in the Arctic. Germany and to a certain 
extent Canada stand out as the two most “reserved” states with respect to lever-
ing national security ambitions in the Arctic region. This comes with an exception 
though, with Canada putting domestic security and homeland defence, not least 
through its NORAD early warning system, at center stage, focusing both on its Arc-
tic residents being secure and well defended, along with the security of the entire 
North American continent. Germany’s role is one of caution when it comes to stra-
tegic ambitions towards the Arctic. Despite being a key European power, Germany 
does not stand out as a leading nation with respect to strategic or military leadership 
in the High North. Instead, this key role is adopted by the US, acting as the strategic 
leader among the North Atlantic states in their endeavour to make the Arctic stable, 
secure, and open to navigation and overflight. However, it is essential to re-emphasize 
the crucial role that US allies and partners play in keeping American leadership 
strong and dominant. As stated in the DoD strategy: “The network of U.S. allies and 
partners with shared national interests in this rules-based order is the United States’ 
greatest strategic advantage in the Arctic region, and thus the cornerstone of DoD’s 
Arctic strategy”.167 
Conclusion
The colder security climate, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, is reflected in 
the Arctic today. This tenser situation can be observed in most of the North Atlan-
tic states’ security thinking on the Arctic, as well as in changed patterns of mili-
tary training and operations. However, while at first glance the changes might lead 
observers to assume that the North West Atlantic states have taken a rather similar 
approach to the strategic challenges of the High North, the specific Arctic strategies 
reveal a somewhat different picture. 
Most notable when comparing the strategies is the rather unique global per-
spective laid out in the US strategy for the region. The British, Norwegian, Danish 
and Canadian perspectives, on the other hand, stand out as much more regional in 
nature. For the UK, Norway and Denmark the focus is primarily on the threat to 
the control of communication lines, sea and land territories as well as of their nearby 
strategic waters. For the UK and Norway, the importance of securing allied presence 
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and access to NATO’s northern flank in case of crisis is of key importance. Canada, 
on the other hand, maintains its focus on defending its Arctic homeland, not engag-
ing in the quest for dominance and control in the North Atlantic or Arctic Ocean.
For the US, the question of having a competitive military edge in the Arctic and 
North Atlantic is crucial, however, its broader focus is not limited to the security- 
calculations of this region. Instead, the Arctic plays an interconnected role in American 
strategic mobility across the globe, in a context of multipolar strategic competition 
where the US is the world’s only military superpower. Hence, the Arctic plays a key role 
regarding US global leadership in a pressured situation characterized by great power 
rivalry. Freedom of navigation and overflight, exemplified by the need to have access 
to the Northern Sea Route, or mobility across the Arctic Ocean, takes center stage in 
the strategic development of the Arctic, seen from Washington DC. While Germany 
displays a rather low profile in its approach to the international security in the Arctic, 
compared to its economic status in Europe, France represents an alternative approach. 
Filling the role of a major power, Paris reveals a strong concern for Arctic shipping and 
freedom of navigation, a perspective not substantially different from that of the USA, 
but with lower global ambitions. 
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